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Case No. 1547 5

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND MATERIAL FACTS
The material facts and statement of the case are set forth
in full in Appellant's initial brief (see pp. 1-7 of Appellant's
Brief) .
The Respondents have agreed that the facts set forth in
Appellant's initial Brief are accurate (seep. 3 of Respondents'
Brief) .

Respondents, however, have added their own statement of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

facts which sets forth at length the parties' respective claims
to title to the one-half mineral interest in dispute (see p. 3 of
Respondents' Brief).
appeal.

Title, however, is not at issue on this

This is a statute of limitation case.

It must be stressed again, that the lower court rendered
it's decision on Respondents' statute of limitation Motion for
Summary Judgment without ever determining or even considering the
validity or relative priority of the parties' alleged titles to
the one-half mineral interest in question.

Accordingly, any

facts on this appeal with respect to how the parties obtained
their respective titles are irrelevant.
Analysis of the parties' respective claims of title to the
subject mineral interest is appropriate at trial only where
evidence pertaining to the parties' alleged titles can be adducea
by all parties.
This is exactly what Appellant seeks on appeal:

Remand to

the trial court for trial on the ultimate issue of who holds
valid title to the disputed one-half mineral interest.
On
(1)

appeal, the only issues before this Court are as follows:
Whether Miller & Viele is in actual possession of the

disputed one-half interest through it's Lessee, Chevron, which
daily extracting oil and gas at the wellhead.

is

Such actual

possession entitles Miller & Viele, pursuant to the applicable
language in the tax title Statutes of Limitation, to a trial on
•

the issue of the validity and relative priority of the parties
titles to the one-half mineral interest in question, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I

(2)

Whether the case should be remanded for trial on the

issue also of a compromise and settlement having been reached in
1946 by Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest whereby Dye's
predecessors acquiesced in Miller & Viele's title to the one-half
mineral interest now in dispute while receiving from Miller &
Viele undisputed title to the remaining one-half mineral interest
and the surface estate of the NW\NE\.
never stipulated to by the parties.

This is an issue of fact
Accordingly, Respondents'

statements (see pp. 2 and 7 of Respondents' Brief) are incorrect
that all the facts were stipulated to or otherwise not in dispute.

-3-
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
MILLER & VIELE IS NOT BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF
LIMITATION FROM INTERPOSING DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF DYE'S TAX
TITLE TO THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL INTEREST BECAUSE
MILLER & VIELE WAS IN POSSESSION OF THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF
MINERAL INTEREST WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS PRIOR TO THE INTERPOSITION OF ITS DEFENSES IN THIS LAWSUIT TO DYE'S TAX TITLE.
A.

Analysis of and Reply to Respondents' Arguments.

The lower court, on summary judgment, held that Miller &
Viele was barred by the applicable statutes of limitation from
interposing its defenses to Plaintiff Dye's alleged tax title to
the disputed one-half

(~)

mineral interest.

1

This decision, of

course, was rendered without hearing any argument or considering
any evidence with respect to the validity of Dye's tax title or
the relative priority of the parties' interests in the disputed
one-half mineral interest.

Nor have the parties stipulated as to ·

who holds valid title to the one-half mineral interest in dispute.
The validity of Dye's tax title would be the ultimate question to
be decided, but is not the subject matter of this appeal.
On an appeal from a summary judgment, the facts are to be
viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant. ~. Whitma!0;
W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918 (1964); Thompson v.
Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964).

Since there

has not yet been any judicial determination as to the validity or
relative priority of the parties' claimed interests in this one·
half mineral interest, it must be assumed on this appeal that the
prior tax deed conveyance by Duchesne County to Dye in 1940 (see
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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,

p. 5 of Appellant's Brief; R-231) did not vest any interest in
Dye to the subject property; it must also be assumed that Dye
obtained his interest in the subject property from the 1946
conveyance from Miller & Viele when Miller & Viele reserved to
itself the disputed one-half mineral interest (see pp. 4-5 of
Appellant's Brief; and p. 5 of Respondents' Brief; R-73; 233).
Plaintiffs-Respondents, however, have assumed throughout
their Brief that it has already been judicially established that
Plaintiff Dye's tax deed is valid.

Respondents claim that this

case does not deal with a severed mineral interest (see p. 12 of
Respondents' Brief); Respondents claim that "the undivided onehalf mineral interest has never been severed from the surface
estate obtained by Duchesne County at the tax sale" (Respondents'
Brief at p. 12).

Accordingly, Respondents' argument on this

appeal rests on a finding never made or even considered by the
lower court: the validity and relative priority of Plaintiff
Dye's tax title obtained from Duchesne County.

The lower court

did not hold nor could it have so held that the mineral estate in
question has not been severed from the surface estate.

Such a

holding would require a finding that Dye's alleged tax title,
rather than Miller & Viele's title to the NW%NE%, was the valid
title with priority; because, if Miller & Viele's title is the
valid title with priority, then when Miller & Viele conveyed the
surface estate and one-half of the mineral rights to Dye's
predecessors in interest in 1946, while reserving to itself the
disputed one-half mineral interest, the disputed one-half mineral
interest was in fact severed!
-5-
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The question on appeal is whether Miller & Viele was in
actual possession of the disputed mineral interest within four
(4) years prior to the interposition of its defenses in this lu
suit to Dye's tax title.

The tax title Statutes of Limitation

clearly provide that, being in actual possession of the disputed
mineral interests, Miller & Viele is entitled to interpose its
defenses to the validity of Dye's alleged tax title and have a
judicial determination, following an evidentiary hearing, of
validity of that tax title.

~e

This is all that Miller & Viele

seeks from this Court on appeal.
Respondents admit in their Brief that the only land interest
in question in this case is the disputed one-half mineral interest
and not the surface estate of the subject property or the remaini:'
one-half mineral interest (see Respondents' Brief at p. 7, and
pp. 3-6).

Yet Respondents argue in their Brief that the "actual

possession" concerned with in the instant case is actual possessk
constituting such acts as cultivating or improving land, protectfa,
land by substantial enclosure, using land for fuel, timber,
pastureage, or expending five (5) dollars per acre in labor or
money to erect or maintain irrigation works (see p. 11 of Respond<:
Brief) .

Obviously, none of those acts could even possibly constit.'

actual possession of a one-half mineral interest.

Respondents'

claim that actual possession requires pedis possessio (foothold
on the land, an actual entry, a possession in fact, a standing
upon it, an occupation of it, as a real, demonstrative act done.
Seep. 11 of Respondents' Brief).

Appellants agree.
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Pedis

possessio of a mineral estate is obtained by withdrawing the
mineral and taking control at the wellhead.

Kanawha and Hocking

Coal and Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1975)
(discussed in detail hereinafter).
That Respondents are confused as to what must be "actually
possessed" is further evident from their statements on pages 12
and 13 and elsewhere in their Brief, where they argue that Miller

&Viele has admitted that it was never in actual occupancy or
possession of the NW\NE\, which they assert includes the unsevered
and undivided one-half mineral interest.

Miller & Viele obviously

does not need to be in possession of the NW\NE\, since that is
not the property in dispute in this case.

Again, as indicated in

the Statement of Facts in Appellant's initial Brief (pp. 4-5),
and as admitted in the parties' Stipulation and Respondents'
brief (p. 5), in 1946 Miller & Viele conveyed to Plaintiff Dye's
predecessors in interest all but the disputed one-half mineral
interest.

Miller & Viele certainly does not claim any interest

in the surf ace and one-half mineral estate that it conveyed to
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest.
Pursuant to the possession exception in the applicable
Statutes of Limitations for tax titles, Miller & Viele must be in
possession not of the surface estate of the NW\NE\, but of the
one-half mineral interest only which is the only property in
dispute.

Respondents admit that the only property in question on

this appeal is the subsurface mineral interest (see Respondents'
Brief p. 7), yet they contradict themselves by continually making

-7-
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reference to and arguing that Miller & Viele must be in possessic
of the surface estate (see~. pp. 11 and 12 of Respondents'
Brief).

In arguing that Miller & Viele must be in possession of

the surface estate, Respondents are arguing with their own admitt,
facts that the only property in dispute in this case is the onehalf mineral interest.
There is absolutely no question that Miller & Viele, througn
its lessee, Chevron Oil, has in fact been in actual possession of
the minerals.

We have the oil and gas l

Respondents have admitte

that Chevron Oil, Miller & Viele's lessee, has in fact for the
past four (4) years extracted oil and gas from the common source
of supply underlying the subject and surrounding properties (see
Respondents' Brief at p. 6 and compare with Appellant's Brief at

p. 7).
It is of absolutely no consequence that the Chevron well is
located on property adjacent to the surface property allegedly
conveyed to Dye by tax deed from Duchesne County.

The appropriat1

Utah State governmental agency has duly made findings of fact and
issued an order making it clear that the Chevron well has been
producing and will continue to produce from a "common pool" of
oil and gas for a six hundred and forty (640) acre area which
includes the disputed one-half mineral interest (see pp. 6, 12,
and

14 of Appellant's Brief).

Based upon these findings, it

makes no difference, notwithstanding Respondents' argument on
page 13 of their Brief, whether the Chevron well was or was not
directional slanted well drilled from its adjacent location into
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a

the minerals located under the surface property which Dye alleges
he received by tax deed conveyance from Duchesne County.
simple fact that you cannot drain half of a lake.

It is a

When pumping

oil and gas from a common pool the oil and gas, which is located
under the surface of the property Plaintiff Dye claims to have
received by tax title conveyance from Duchesne County, is going
to be withdrawn and therefore possessed at the wellhead.

The

Utah Board of Oil and Gas Conservation so found in its Findings
of Fact and Order set forth in Appellant's initial Brief (pp. 6,

12 and 14), which fact is admitted by Respondents (Respondents'
Brief at p. 6).

There is no basis for the Respondents to argue

that Chevron Oil Company, Miller & Viele's lessee, was not in
possession of the oil and gas and therefore the mineral estate so
as to fall within the exception set forth in the applicable
Statutes of Limitation for tax titles.
Respondents question whether possession by the lessee
constitutes possession by the lessor (seep. 8 of Respondents'
Brief).

Respondents do not, however, cite any cases or other

authority for their position.

On the other hand, Miller & Viele,

on page 11 in its initial Brief, cited numerous cases supporting
the universal rule of law that "possession of a tenant is that of
his landlord."

See also,~· Edgeller v. Johnston, 262 P.2d.

1006, 1011 (Idaho 1953); Cusic v. Givens, 215 P.1d. 297, 298

(Idaho 1950); 49 Am. Jur. 2d. Section 1, "Landlord and Tenant".
Respondents further argue, on page 22 of their Brief, that
as a matter of policy, Chevron "should not be considered to be in
-9-
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possession of the undivided one-half mineral interest in the
l..NEl...
NW-..
-.. II

I n so arguing,
.
Respondents again err in assuming that

the disputed one-half mineral interest is undivided.

As indicate

above, it must be assumed on this appeal that the mineral interei
in dispute was severed at the time Miller & Viele conveyed to
Dye's predecessors the NW\NE~, except for the one-half mineral
interest now in dispute.
In addition, Respondents argue that even though Chevron has
possession of the oil and gas at the wellhead, Chevron is in
possession in its capacity as operator of the drilling unit
rather than as Miller & Viele' s lessee (see Respondents' Brief at
p. 22).

Respondents then argue that it would be inequitable and

contrary to the purpose of statutes of limitation generally to
allow Miller & Viele to claim its possession pursuant to the
exceptions in the statutes of limitation for tax titles by the
"fortuitous fluke of circumstances" in which Chevron, as Miller!
Viele's lessee, became the operator of the drilling unit establid
by the Utah Board of Oil
Brief at p. 22).

& Gas Conservation (see Respondents'

In so arguing, Respondents fail to realize that

Chevron became a party to the pooling agreement in the first
instance in that it claims and holds a lease-hold interest from
Miller

& Viele in the disputed one-half mineral interest.

In

making this argument, it is evident that Respondents' real point
of contention is with the tax title Statutes of Limitation themse'
While Respondents may feel that the tax title Statutes of LimHatl
are ill-advised in providing the exception they do to the runnin'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the Statutes, the Statutes as passed by the Utah Legislature
are the prevailing applicable law in Utah, and those statutes
clearly provide an exception to the running of the limitation
time period when the one interposing defenses to a tax title has
actually been in possession of the property interest in dispute
within four (4) years prior to the interposition of the defenses
to the tax title.

Nowhere in the Statutes does it say that

actual possession of disputed property by fortuitous circumstances
does not fall within the exception set forth therein.
In addition, it is totally irrelevant and immaterial for
Respondents to argue that notwithstanding its actual possession
of the disputed one-half mineral interst, Miller & Viele should
not be afforded the opportunity to challenge the validity of the
tax title "forty-six years after creation of the title" (see
Respondents' Brief at p. 23).

This in fact is exactly what the

tax title Statutes of Limitation contemplate.

There is no

provision in those Statutes of Limitation to the effect that the
possession exception does not apply after a certain passage of
time.

All that is required is actual possession of the property

in dispute within four (4) years prior to the interposition of
defenses to the tax title.

Respondents' argument that we ignore

the statutes simply is not a viable alternative in this case.
Respondents also argue, on page 23 of their Brief, that "it
is inconceivable that a sophisticated mortgage banking company
such as Miller & Viele would not have paid property taxes on the
NW\NE\ from 1928 to 1946 or investigated the reasons for not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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having been assessed if they really thought they owned the prope;
Again, however, there has been absolutely no judicial determination or even investigation into the actual ownership of or
title to the property in question.

It

is not known at this point

whether Dye's tax title is valid, or, if so, whether it has
priority over or is subordinate to Miller & Viele's mortgage
foreclosure interest in the subject property. Respondents evident.
want to argue on appeal who has the actual ownership of the
subject property and who thought they had ownership of the subjec
property.

This is exactly what Miller

&

Viele desires and seeks:

A remand to the trial court for determination by that court,
following trial, of the validity of Dye's alleged tax title and
the relative priority of the parties' claimed interests.
Respondents also miss the point when they argue on page 23
of their Brief that it would be injustice if
Miller & Viele might now be allowed to reap the benefits of
the land when it was Dye's predecessors in interest who paia
all property taxes levied and assessed upon the land since
1927, and who have actually possessed, improved, and maintained the NW~NE~ since 1940.
Respondents, in making this statement, completely ignore their
own stipulated facts that Miller & Viele is not claiming any
interest in the NW~NE~ except for the disputed one-half mineral
interest.

Miller & Viele is not seeking any benefit from the

surface of the land nor would Miller & Viele have paid any such
property taxes on the land, since in 1946 Miller & Viele itself
conveyed all but the disputed one-half mineral interest to
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest.

In addition, this
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again is an argument to be made before the trial court at trial,
and not in this Court on appeal, since it deals with whether
Miller & Viele

~as

title to the disputed one-half mineral interest

or whether Dye has title to the same through his purported tax
title.
It should also be noted that Respondents' argument that
Chevron never participated in the motions for summary judgment
nor the appeal (page 23 of Respondents' Brief), has no bearing
whatsoever on the issue on appeal.

In fact, this argument further

underscores Respondents' apparent confusion in believing that
there has been a determination of who owns title to the disputed
one-half mineral interest or that that issue is somehow on appeal
before this Court.

This is a further indication of the need to

remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the
validity of Dye's purported tax title with respect to Miller &
Viele's mortgage foreclosure title.

Miller & Viele notes, however,

for the record, that in an effort to minimize litigation expense
and delay, Chevron Oil simply tendered to Miller & Viele a defense
of Miller & Viele's position regarding ownership of the disputed
one-half mineral interest.
With respect to Section 40-6-6(f), Appellants have not, as
Respondents claim on page 18 of their Brief, miscontrued that
section.

Section 40-6-6(f) states:

"In the absence of voluntary

pooling, . . [o]perations incident to the drilling of a well
upon any portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be
deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of such operations upon

-13-
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each separately owned tract in the unit by the several owners
thereof [emphasis added]."

Although the parties "voluntarily"

agreed to enter into the Communitization Agreement, they were
actually and in fact forced to enter into said Agreement because
of the drilling order establishing the six hundred forty (640)
acre tract as a single drilling unit.
Al so, it is important to note that the intent of the drafter
of Section 40-6-6(f) has been carried forth, preserved, and
agreed to in Paragraph 8 of the Communitization Agreement (see
Appellant's Brief at pp. 13, 14, and 19).

The parties themselve1

including Respondent Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc., have agree1
and dictated that the production of the oil and gas from the
Chevron well constitutes production of the oil and gas from each
of the lands comprising the six hundred forty ( 640) acre drillini
unit.

This Agreement parallels the findings of the Utah Board oi

Oil and Gas Conservation that there is a pool of gas and oil
common to the entire six hundred forty ( 640) acres, including the
disputed one-half mineral interest property from which Chevron,
as Miller & Viele's lessee, is extracting oil and gas.

B.

Inapplicability of Respondents' Authorities as Suppon
For Their Position.

The few authorities cited by Respondents in their Brief
either clearly support Appellant's position or are distinguishabl:
and not on point with the facts or issues in the instant case.
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In Kanawha and Hocking Coal and Coke Co. v. Carbon County,
535 P. 2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1975), cited on Page 11 of Respondents'
Brief, the Court held that there was no actual possession of the
severed mineral estate where there was no actual possession of
the bed through mining and extraction.
Appellant's position.

This case clearly supports

Applying Kanawha to the instant case,

there is no actual possession of the mineral estate where there
is no actual possession of the oil or gas.

In the instant case,

Appellant in fact has been in actual possession of the oil and
gas from the mineral interest in dispute and therefore is in
actual possession of the mineral estate.

Appellant has been in

possession of this oil and gas within four (4) years prior to the
initiation of this action and interposition herein of its defenses
to Dye's alleged tax title; consequently, the Appellant falls
within the exception expressly set forth in the tax title Statutes
of Limitation and now, therefore, Appellant should be given its
day in court to challenge the validity of Dye's alleged tax title
at trial.
Respondents' statement that the lower court found Dixon v.
American Liberty Oil Co., 77 So.2d 533, 538, 4 Oil and Gas 17, 21
0954), to be "so convincing in ruling in plaintiffs' favor" is
totally unsubstantiated (see Respondents' Brief at p. 14).

There

are absolutely no findings by the lower court with respect to the
court's application of that case to the instant case.

In addition,

Respondents' citation of that case in hopeful support of their
own position, evidences the misunderstanding of Respondents with
-15-
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respect to the actual issues on appeal before this Court.

As

indicated on pages 16 and 17 of Appellant's initial Brief, the
court in Dixon rejected the claims of the operator of an oil and
gas well located on pooled lands to adverse possession over all
the lands of the pooled area by virtue of its operation of and
control of the well.

In rejecting that argument, and in holding

that each mineral lessee of land within the pooled area was in
possession of its own respective leasehold interests, the court
again stated that
the drilling and production of oil from a unitized
area constitutes an exercise and user of mineral
rights throughout the entire unit and operates as
a substitute for performance of drilling obligations
contained in a mineral lease [4 Oil and Gas Reporter
at 22].
Al though Respondents' argument is less than clear, they are
apparently taking the position that since the court in Dixon

he!~

that the well operator could not adversely possess the mineral
interests of lease holders of property within the pooled area,
Chevron Oil in the instant case, as the well operator of the
pooling unit, was not in possession of minerals extracted from
its own leased land within the six hundred forty (640) acre areal
This argument not only does not follow from the Court's holding
in Dixon, but in fact just the opposite:

Dixon stands for the

proposition that each holder of a lease covering lands within the
pooled area is in actual possession of its minerals as extracted
by the well operator for the pooled area.

Chevron, therefore, ai

Miller & Viele' s lessee of the NWli;NEli;, is in actual possession
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of

the oil and gas from the NW~NE~, through its efforts as operator
of the one well allowed on the six hundred forty (640) acre
drilling unit.
In citing Dixon as support for their position, Respondents
also evidence once again their confusion of the issue on appeal
in the instant case.

The lower court in the instant case did not

hold, as Respondents claim the court did in Dixon, that "the
mineral estate could not be thought of as separate from the
surface estate, since both estates were owned by the same party
and had not been severed" (see p. 15 of Respondents' Brief).

As

discussed in detail above, there has not yet been any judicial
decision as to the validity of the parties' respective claimed
titles or severance of the mineral estate.

The fact that Respondents

rest their argument on a finding that the lower court never made
or even considered (that Dye's tax title is valid), simply
underscores the necessity of remanding this case to the trial
court for determination of which of the parties' respective
titles and interests are valid and have priority.
The only applicable holding in Dixon to the instant case is
the one set forth in Appellant's initial Brief, pages 16 and 17,
showing that the court in Dixon explicitly held that drilling and
production of oil from a unitized area constitutes an exercise and
~of

mineral rights throughout the entire unit, but that such

acts are not sufficient to evict other interest holders of land
in the pooled area.

The reason is obvious; there is no notice or

hostility that is required for purposes of adverse possession.
-17-
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The Respondents also cite R. Hemingway, The Law of Oil and
Gas 124 (1971) (see p. 14 of Respondents' Brief) as standing for
the persuasive rule that removal of oil and gas from under a
tract of land by means of a well located on adjacent or nearby
tracts, even if included in the same production unit, is insuffi·
cient to constitute actual possession of the mineral estate.

It

is important to note, however, that this statement extracted by
Respondents was made in the context of determining whether oil
and gas was being adversely possessed.

Specifically, removal of

oil and gas from under a tract of land by means of a well locate(
on an adj a cent tract in the same production unit is not sufficien
to constitute possession so as to satisfy the requirements for
adverse possession.

The citation from Hemingway which Respondent

cite in their Brief, refers in footnote to the case of Brizzolan
Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W. 2d 728 (1949).

The footnote

explicitly states that the result in this case was based upon
"lack of notice" thus eliminating the hostility requirement for
adverse possession.

There was no actual possession sufficient

to

satisfy the adverse possession statute because possession by
drilling on an adjacent tract of land does not provide the necesi:
notice and is not open and notorious nor hostile as required by
the elements for adverse possession.

Accordingly, this statement

from Hemingway cited by the Respondents is irrelevant and immater
to the instant case.
Respondents also rely upon Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125,
339 P.2d 1019 (1959) (seep. 15 of Respondents' Brief).
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The

facts in Chase are completely distinguishable from the facts in
the instant case.

The issue in Chase was whether undetached

minerals are part of the earth and therefore realty.

In other

words, are oil and gas leases included within the term "real
estate"?

That case is not applicable since in the instant case,

the minerals are detached as they are extracted by Chevron Oil.
Oil and gas is pumped and actually possessed by the Appellant at
the wellhead.

What constitutes actual possession of a mineral

estate was not even at issue in the Chase case.
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Candelaria, 403 F.2d 351,

31 Oil and Gas 215 (10th Cir. 1968), cited by Respondents on page
16 of their Brief, also deals exclusively with actual possession

in terms of the absence of the hostility requirement.

In that

case, the court stressed the elements of adverse possession:
Actual, visible, physical, exclusive, hostile, and continuous
possession.

The court stated that when any of the elements is

missing no title by adverse possession can be obtained.

The

court then held that the Appellants had not met all of the
requirements of the adverse possession statute and the title was
quieted in the Respondent.
In attaching to their Brief Findings of Fact 10 through 19
from the Pan American case (seep. 3 of appendix to Respondents'
Brief), Respondents make clear the fact that this is an adverse
possession case turning on the issue of a lack of notice and
hostility.

Contrary to the statement made by the Respondents on

page 16 their Brief to the effect that the case did not turn on
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the elements of notice or hostility, but rather lack of actual
possession, paragraph 17 of the Findings of Fact clearly states
that the plaintiffs were not aware of the wells there involved o:
that they owned the land involved, nor were they aware of any of
the proceedings relative to the quiet title suit, in that plaint:
did not discover that they could assert any of the claims assert<
therein until they were joined as parties-defendant.

This findi:.

of fact led the court to conclude that there was no actual posse;
because of lack of notice since the drilling was being
on land adjacent to the land in question.

perform~

Accordingly, the

findings of fact and conclusions of law cited by Respondents

~

their Brief fail to support Respondents' conclusion.
Finally, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926
(10th Cir. 1954), cited by Respondents on Page 16 of their
Brief, is also distinguishable on its facts and has absolutelyno
relevance to the issue on appeal.

In Phillips, the court held

that the rule of perpetuities, which was at issue in the case,
was not violated by unitization because unitization affects
allocation of production and the computation of royalties, but
not cross-transfers or royalty interests.

This is obviously

totally irrelevant to the issue at hand.
Also at issue in Phillips was whether the unitization
provisions in the oil and gas leases were sufficient to grant
authority to the lessee, as lessor's agent, to enter into a unit
plan for development and operation, and to make a future contract
to effectuate such plans.

The court held that the unitization
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1

agreements were sufficient to grant authority to the lessee to
enter into a unit plan so long as the lessee acted in good faith,
with due

rega~d

for the lessor's interests, and provided for fair

apportionment of the oil produced.

It is evident that this issue

is also totally irrelevant to the facts and issue in the instant
case.

The question of actual possession of the mineral estate

was never at issue in Phil lips.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF DYE'S PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST ACQUIESCED IN
MILLER & VIELE'S TITLE TO THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL
INTEREST BY SOLICITING AND ACCEPTING THE 1946 DEED IN WHICH
THE DISPUTED ONE-HALF MINERAL INTEREST WAS RESERVED TO
MILLER & VIELE.
In response to Point Two of Appellant's argument in its
initial brief, Respondents admit the question of fact that must
yet be determined by the trier of fact.
In their argument, Respondents correctly observe that the
1946 deed conveying Miller

& Viele's interest to Plaintiff Dye's

predecessors in interest in the surface and one-half of the
mineral estate of the NW!i;NV!; was entitled "Quit-claim deed
(special) , " but, in the words of counsel for Respondents,
"strangely enough, contains words of warranty" (see Respondents'
Brief at p . 2 5) .
After correctly making that observation, however, Respondents
conclude on pages 25 and 26 of their Brief that "[i] t is obvious
that a standard form 'Warranty Deed (Special)' was used from
which the words 'warranty' were struck from the title of the
document in words of grant".

Respondents then conclude:
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The words 'Quit-Claim' were interlineated in
both the title and words of grant, demonstrating
that both parties desire that the instrument
evidence a quitclaim of the NW\NE\ [Respondents'
Brief at p. 26].
While the document itself is obviously some evidence of the
intent of the parties, it is not sufficient evidence in and of
itself for this Court to determine what the actual intention of
the parties was with respect to that conveyance.

The actual

intention of the parties involved can only be ascertained from
evidence heard by the trial court at trial.

It is not

suffici~

for Respondents to merely conclude that "it is obvious" that the
parties intended to convey Miller & Viele's interest in the
surface and one-half mineral estate by means of a quit claim deei
as opposed to a Warranty deed.

The only way proper determinatior

can be made of this factual issue is for the case to be remanded
to the trial court for consideration of that issue which the
trial court previously refused to consider.
In that regard, it is extremely significant that in the case
of Wallace v. Build Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965)
(cited by Respondents on page 26 of their Brief for the principal
that a quitclaim deed does not imply the conveyance of any partk1
interest in the property) , this Court stated as follows with
respect to whether Plaintiff breached the contract evidenced by
the quitclaim deed in question:
We are quite in accord with the Defendant's
contention that the various dealings of the
parties should be considered together [402
P. 2d at 700].
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The court then listed all the evidentary facts before the
trial court supporting the trial court's decision that the
Plaintiff did not breach the contract evidenced by the quitclaim
deed.

In the instant case, of course, the trial court did not

consider any evidence at all; consequently, the Respondents have
no support of any kind for their conclusion that the compromise
and agreement between the parties in 1946 did not constitute an
acquiescence on the part of Dye's predecessors in interest to
Miller & Viele's title in the subject property.
Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial court
for further discovery and trial on the issue of whether a compromise
and settlement was actually reached between Plaintiff Dye's
predecessors in interest and Miller & Viele as evidenced by the
solicitation and acceptance of the 1946 Miller & Viele deed to
the subject property.
From the above discussion, it is evident that Respondents'
statement made several times in its Brief, that all of the facts
in the instant case have been stipulated to, simply is not true

(see Respondents' Brief at pp. 2 and 7).

There has not been any

stipulation whatsoever with respect to the acquiescence by
Plaintiff Dye's predecessors in interest to Miller & Viele's
title to the subject property or with respect to a compromise and
settlement having been reached in 1946.

Accordingly, Miller &

Viele takes exception to Respondents' statements to the effect
that all the facts have been stipulated to.

They simply have

not.

-23-
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CONCLUSION

Respondents' Brief and argument are based upon the mistaken
premise that the alleged tax title of Plaintiff Dye is valid and
has priority over Miller

&

Viele' s mortgage foreclosure interest.

The lower court, however, never determined or even considered
this issue in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment
on the appeal issue of the Statutes of Limitation.

In addition,

the authorities cited by Respondents clearly are not on point
with the real issue on appeal in the instant case, with the
exception only of the Kanawha and Dixon cases, which actually
support Appellant's position.
Miller & Viele, through its lessee, Chevron, is in actual
possession of the disputed one-half mineral interest.

Chevron,

since 1974, has continuously extracted the oil and gas from the
common source of supply for the entire six hundred and forty
( 640) acre pooling unit, including the NWli;NEJi;.

We have the oil

and gas and therefore actual possession of the disputed mineral
interest.

Miller & Viele therefore comes within the "actual

possession" exception in the tax title Statutes of Limitation.
Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
trial on the issue of the validity and relative priority of the
parties' respective titles to the disputed one-half mineral
interest.
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There also remains for trial the factual determination of
whether the predecessors in interest to Plaintiff Dye's alleged
tax title reached a compromise and settlement with Miller & Viele
in 1946 whereby Dye's predecessors acquiesced in Miller & Viele's
title to the one-half mineral interest now in dispute while
receiving from Miller & Viele undisputed title to the other onehalf mineral interest and the surface estate of the

NW~NE~.
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